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Varieties of CSR:  Institutions and Socially Responsible Behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A central concern within contemporary socio-economics has been on the relationship 
between national institutional configurations and societal outcomes. In this paper, we 
assess the relationship between legal origin and a range of correlated indicators of social 
responsibility, focusing on socially responsible investing and voluntary charitable giving. 
We found that in Common Law contexts, lower levels of social responsibility than in 
Civil Law contexts, other than in the area of charitable giving, where the converse was 
the case. We explore the reasons for this distinction, and for the different patterns 
encountered in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe. Based on the findings, we 
identify directions for future research. 
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Varieties of CSR:  Institutions and Socially Responsible Behaviour 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This is a study on the relationship between legal origin and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR).  We supplement this with an analysis of the effects of corruption 
on voluntary giving.  Legal origin is defined according to the widely deployed categories 
of La Porta et al. (2008), which divides countries into legal families, according to 
whether corporate law is primarily the result of legislation or judicial decisions.  
Meanwhile, voluntary CSR and country giving rates are derived from the Global 
Competitiveness Report (Porter et al, 2004; 2005) and the World Giving Index (CAF, 
2010) respectively, and corruption from the World Bank Worldwide Governance index 
(2010).  A central theme in the existing academic literature has been the relationship 
between institutions, and the relative resource allocations and power accorded to different 
players.  There are relatively few studies on the relationship between institutional context 
and corporate social responsibility practices (Brammer et al., 2012). This study adds to 
the literature through bringing new data to the table, and focusing on a wide range of 
countries, and confirms the persistence of national difference, with CSR being more 
widespread in civil law countries. 
 It has been argued that corporations are experiencing increased pressures to align 
their business with ethical norms and practices, balancing CSR practices with business 
and ethical norms and values (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). Yet, there are many 
different indices of corporate social responsibility that aim to intermesh economic and 
ethical principles in the context of wider business decisions (Brown and Forster, 2013; 
Gjølberg 2009). CSR practices can be broadly distinguished along the economic, ethical, 
and environmental dimensions (Carroll, 1991; Schwartz and Carroll, 2003). The former 
includes not only codes of conduct/corruption, risk and crisis management, and customer 
and investment relations (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010), but also overall patterns of 
investment (Bengtsson 2008). The ethical dimensions of CSR range from labour practices 
to social reporting, and environmental from energy efficiency to environmental 
marketing.  
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While there is no scarcity of discussions regarding the social and ethical roots of 
CSR and its implication for the performance of companies (Brown and Forster, 2013; 
Kiessling et al, 2015), only a limited amount of comparative work linking CSR to 
institutional settings exists (Tatoglu et al., 2014; Brammer et. al. 2012; Campbell, 2007), 
deploying one or other of the capitalist archetypes identified within the literature on 
comparative capitalism (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010, p.371; Jamali et al, 2009; 
Matten and Moon 2008). A central theme in the literature has been seeking to focus on 
differences between mature economies where shareholder rights are paramount 
(developed Common Law/Liberal Market Economies [LMEs]), and those where 
shareholder rights are weaker and those of other stakeholders stronger (developed Civil 
Law/Coordinated Market Economies [CMEs]). In contrast to the Varieties of Capitalism 
and similar approaches to comparative capitalism, legal origin theory has limitations in 
that it accords primacy to a single institutional characteristic. However, the national 
categories that form the centre of such analysis (civil vs common law) can be applied to 
all economies, whether developed or not.  
The vast majority of comparative CSR research has been conducted in developed 
economies, while insights from developing, mixed and µWUDQVLWLRQDO¶ post-socialist 
countries have been scant (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007; Tatoglu et al., 2014). This paper 
aims to contribute to this lacuna by exploring (Matten and Moon 2008) the effect of legal 
origin on two distinct areas that have been widely considered as key features of CSR: 
socially responsible investing (SRI) and charitable giving (Hill et. al, 2007; Jamali and 
Mirshak, 2007). 
A common feature of both the Legal Origin approach and the classic literature on 
comparative capitalism is that there is a focus on institutional feature and societal level 
outcomes (Hall and Soskice 2001; La Porta et al. 2008; Wood et al. 2014); actors respond 
to embedded societal structures and associated relations to generate broad patterns of 
economic growth and variations in relative stakeholder prosperity. Such analysis is firm 
centered in that it assumes firms play a central role in responding to institutional 
pressures and, in acting both individually and in concert, contribution to overall societal 
outcomes (ibid.; Whitley 1999).  This research is founded on such assumptions in that we 
explore the relationship between setting and overall CSR outcomes, which, of necessity, 
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must have been the result of decisions by significant numbers of firms to adopt particular 
patterns of behavior (c.f. Wood et al. 2014). At the same time, we recognize that a closer 
analysis of CSR behavior at the level of the individual firm would yield a much nuanced 
and diverse picture, with potentially the choices of large players, or those concentrated 
within specific regions, outweighing those of others. 
More specifically, the paper aims to explore in more detail whether CSR is more 
likely to be promoted through shareholder primary, which is a characteristic of developed 
Common Law countries/LMEs, or in contexts where institutional mediation between 
different sets of stakeholder interests is more pronounced (developed Civil Law/CMEs). 
Based on composite indices created for 98 countries around the world, we use linear 
regression analysis to test hypotheses examining impact of legal origin and corruption 
control on voluntary CSR dimensions. The paper examines voluntary CSR by two 
dimensions based on composite indices created: socially responsible investment (SRI) 
and charitable giving index. Hence, we estimate two sets of regression models which also 
include interactions between different control variables.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we 
provide a critical review of relevant literature on institutional theory, comparative 
institutionalism and CSR that serves as a basis for development of our hypotheses. 
)XUWKHU WKH SDSHU¶V PHWKRGRORJ\ LV RXWOLQHG DQG WKLV LV IROORZHG E\ WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI
study results and their implication for our proposed hypotheses. The last section provides 
a conclusion and outlines avenues for future research. 
 
2. Review of relevant literature 
 
2.1 Forms of Comparative Institutional Analysis and Stakeholder Allocations 
 
In this paper, we deploy the categorizations developed by La Porta et al. (1998) from 
within the rational-hierarchical literature, which remains one of the most influential ways 
of comparing national systems across the developing and developed world.   La Porta et 
al. (1998; 2000) contend that it is legal origin that determines private property rights. In 
practical terms, this means that in Common Law countries, shareholders are more likely 
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to be able to reign in managers and ensure that they adhere to a value maximization 
agenda (ibid.); hence, such contexts may be referred to as shareholder dominant. In 
contrast, in Civil Law countries, the greater rights accorded to other stakeholders means 
that shareholders cannot be assured of their dominance, or that their profit maximization 
agenda will be rigorously followed by managers (La Porta et al. 1998). Within the most 
developed countries, these categories broadly correspond with the well-known liberal 
market economy/coordinated market economy dichotomy of the Hall and Soskice (2001) 
Varieties of Capitalism approach, although the legal origin approach is more easily 
extended to cover the developing world, and transitional economies. Table 1 summarizes 
their categorization of different countries according to legal origin.  La Porta et al. (1998) 
suggest that French Civil Law origin countries come closest to the Civil Law ideal, 
followed by German and then Scandinavian law.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
  
In line with the mainstream economics and finance literature, La Porta et al. (1998; 2000) 
hold that, if left to their own devices, managers will drift away from the shareholder 
value maximization agenda, to engage in empire building, in the interests of personal 
reward and prestige. In doing this, they will naturally seek to collude with employees and 
other stakeholders (Botero et al., 2004). This approach assumes that stakeholder and 
owner rights are a zero sum game (Goergen et al., 2009).  Should one side win, the other 
will invariably lose out (ibid.). This argument is a development of the basic Friedmanite 
idea that the usage of firm resources on CSR represents a misdirection of what rightly 
belongs to shareholders.  
 Botero et al. (2004) argue that in Common Law systems, firms divert resources to 
promote the well being of non-owner interest groupings through two basic mechanisms. 
The first is µneglect¶; owners simply have less legal clout to supervise managers as their 
agents, allowing the latter to divert organizational resources in unproductive directions 
(Botero et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 2000). The second is through active legal 
compulsion. Botero et al. (2004) argue that laws governing worker rights (and, by 
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implication, those of other stakeholders) will tend to be particularly strong in contexts 
where formal owner rights are weak. In other words, not only in such contexts do owners 
have weaker formal private property rights, but also they are likely to be further diluted 
by other legislation, reinforcing the Civil Law legal tradition. Conversely, in Common 
Law countries, there is likely to be less legislation compelling owners to direct more 
resources to other stakeholder groupings.  
 
2.2 Setting and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
 
In making strategic choices firms are directed both through formal rules and 
informal conventions and pressures (Amable 2003, p.34; North, 1990).  Matten and 
Moon (2008) posit that within the owner dominant Common Law settings explicit CSR is 
more common, and in Civil Law contexts, where stakeholder rights are stronger, implicit 
CSR is more predominant. They define explicit CSR as voluntary initiatives and 
strategies ³which combine social and business value´ (Matten and Moon 2008, p.409).  
,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH\DUHERWKDµJLIW¶RIWKHILUPWKDWPD\EHZLWKGUDZQDWDQ\WLPHDQG
their rationale may combine a desire to contribute to society with hard-nosed business 
logic. Implicit CSR is where firms are impelled by formal and informal institutions to 
address issues of concern by stakeholders (ibid.). In other words, socially responsible 
behavior will not solely reflect the law; in addition to formal regulation, informal rules 
and conventions are likely to determine CSR outcomes. This would suggest the need for 
close attention to be paid to possible differences between voluntary and involuntary or 
systemically implicit dimensions of CSR when making usage of composite measures. 
 
2.2.1 Responsible Stakeholder Capitalism (or the Mediating Effects of Civil 
Law) 
 
It can be argued that in contexts where owner rights are mediated by those of other 
stakeholders, firms are more likely to be socially responsible (Jackson and Apostolakou 
2010). A key feature of Civil Law countries is that power is divided between a wide 
range of interest groupings. For instance, institutional theorists assert that in contexts with 
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stronger rights bestowed to other stakeholders and interest groups, institutional actors 
such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can be particularly effective and 
successful in monitoring corporate behaviour, influencing the policy-making process, and 
thus exerting pressure on firms to be more socially responsible (Campbell, 2006). 
 It is also acknowledged that specific stakeholder orientated Civil Law countries ± 
for example, Germany and the Scandinavian countries ± are leaders when it comes to 
environmental responsibility (c.f. Lynes and Andrachuk 2008). Strong welfarist policies 
encourage firms to adopt high standards, resulting in a superior environmental and social 
performance (Gjølberg 2009, p.610). It has been further suggested that the systemic 
mediation of corporate power with stakeholder interests allows for the adoption of a 
longer-term view that necessarily encompasses issues of environmental sustainability and 
responsible investing (ibid.). Hence, firms are more likely to promote employment 
conditions that contribute to employee well-being, more responsible relations with 
customers and suppliers, and more environmentally friendly business practices (Gjølberg 
2009). The branch of organisational institutionalism, which places more focus on societal 
norms, emphasises that such socially responsible behaviour may be more pronounced in 
Civil Law contexts also because of embedded normative standards in such environments, 
ZKHUH RUJDQL]DWLRQV KDYH ³LPSOLFLW FRPPLWPHQW´ WR act in more socially responsible 
ways to other stakeholders (Campbell, 2006, p.933; Matten and Moon, 2008).  
 
2.2.2 Owner Rights and CSR 
 
Within the finance literature, a dominant strand of thinking suggests that when property 
rights are stronger (i.e. Common Law countries), shareholders will be better equipped to 
restrain managers from excessive empire building, and the vanity projects (La Porta et al. 
1998; 2000). Although CSR spend does not necessarily denote an agency failing, certain 
types of CSR spending may do so. Essentially, it is held that the business of business is to 
make money, with inappropriate CSR ± that which does not immediately contribute to the 
enhancing the bottom line - being essentially theft of shareholder resources in order for 
managers to promote themselves and enhance their prestige (Friedman, 1997).  
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Economic institutional analysis, through its focus on regulations and institutional 
design, further suggests that acts of deregulation, which entail decrease in monitoring and 
enforcement activities, may reduce RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ VRFLDOO\ UHVSRQVLEOH EHhaviour and 
even result in some behaving in socially irresponsible ways (Campbell, 2006; 2007; 
North, 1990; Demirbag, Frecknall-Hughes, Glaister, and Tatoglu, 2013). Thus, it could 
further be argued that in Common Law countries, less attention will be devoted to 
socially responsible activities, not only on account of formal regulation, but also because 
of generally weaker formal ties between stakeholders, and more limited discretion 
accorded to management to pursue agendas other than profit maximization. Less 
encompassing institutional frameworks lead to organizations doing little more than the 
EDUHPLQLPXPVHH'H&DVWURHWDO2¶+DJDQ2UJDQL]DWLRQVWKDWDFW LQD
responsible manner are likely to face the constant undercutting of their position by less 
SULQFLSOHGFRPSHWLWRUVIRUFLQJDµUDFHWRWKHERWWRP¶0HOODKLDQG:RRGD µ6RIW
UXOHV¶RQWKHLUown are unlikely to be able to deter opportunism (ibid.). As owners face 
fewer institutional constraints, they are more likely to pursue narrow short-term interests 
in investment decisions (Gourevitch and Shinn 2006). These discussions inform our first 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1. In Common Law (owner-dominant) settings, overall levels of social 
responsibility will be lower than in Civil Law Countries. 
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that CSR can assume greater importance in liberal 
markets. Within common law countries the state cannot be relied on to the same extent to 
stabilize relations between communities and firms through providing a durable social 
infrastructure (Habermas, 1976; Mellahi and Wood, 2004b). Yet, some dialogue and trust 
is necessary to make exchange relations work (ibid.). Hence, corporate philanthropy 
emerged and persisted ³as an ideological movement intended to legitimize the power of 
large corporations´ (c.f. Mitchell, 1989; Oberman, 2000, p.239). Jackson and 
Apostolakou (2010) argue that, in the developed Common Law countries (LMEs), firms 
are likely to be more socially responsible in CSR, reflecting primarily instrumental 
motives on the behalf of firms, who are particularly sensitive to investor and customer 
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pressures, and whose room for maneuver is less restricted by insider interests (that is, 
managers or workers) within the firm (see also: Aguilera et al, 2006). Given this, it could 
be argued that firms are more likely to implement measures that are prompted by specific 
DQG LPPHGLDWH FULVHV RI OHJLWLPDF\ 6XFK PHDVXUHV FRXOG HQFRPSDVV µJUHHQZDVKLQJ¶
centering on environmental marketing and the high profile adoption of a limited range of 
environmental measures than a comprehensive change in policies (Mellahi and Wood, 
2004a; 2004b; Mellahi et al. 2010). Existing literature would suggest such practices are 
indeed more common in contexts where property owner rights are the strongest and/or 
the legitimation crisis particularly severe (Burnell and Ware, 2007; Hearit, 1995; 
McCarthy and Puffer, 2008).    
To put it differently, firms are more likely to implement measures that are 
prompted by specific and immediate crises of legitimacy. Most typically, this takes the 
form of charitable or quasi-charitable giving (Mellahi, et al. 2010).  An example of the 
latter would be junk food manufacturers making highly publicized, yet carefully 
calculated, donations to schools and to promoting FKLOGUHQ¶V VSRUWV FI LELG 2WKHUV
would be oil companies making donations to ostensibly independent charitable 
foundations or NGOs that focus on denying global warming, and pharmaceutical 
FRPSDQLHV WR µSDWLHQW ULJKWV¶ JURXSLQJV WKDW YRFLILFHURXVO\ GHmand state funding for 
expensive drug cures. Similarly, instrumental and widespread are donations to charitable 
foundations or think tanks with close links to specific political parties. Giving to more 
objectively charitable causes may also serve instrumental motives. Again, an example 
would be junk food manufacturers sponsoring international sporting events to encourage 
an association of their brand with health, well-being and athletic prowess.  
Furthermore, it could be asserted that in such contexts firms may be more socially 
responsible for reasons other than simply legitimation. Firstly, socially responsible 
investing has been promoted as good for business (Hill et. al. 2007), and hence, it could 
be argued that it is more likely to be encountered in lightly regulated contexts where 
property owners are freest to pursue new opportunities as and when they arise.  Socially 
responsible investing may represent a sound business decision, given the increased 
consumer demand for responsibly sourced products (c.f. Klassen and McLaughlin 1996). 
Secondly, within contexts where property owner rights are weaker, resources have to be 
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shared across a wide range of entrenched stakeholder interests. This may make it difficult 
to divert resources towards new directions (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010). For 
example, organized labour may be hostile if a proportion of the share of resources 
potentially allocatable to workers is diverted to meet an increasingly important 
environmental agenda. Any benefits accruing from the latter are likely to be spread across 
society at large, whilst the upfront costs will be shouldered by the immediate stakeholders 
in the firm. 
Thus, whilst owners may be better equipped to prevent managers from directing 
resources away from immediate profits, they may be forced to do so in order to overcome 
legitimation crises generated by the system (Habermas, 1976; Hearit, 1995). In other 
words, whilst firms may be less inclined to engage in a range of socially responsible 
behavior, they are nonetheless likely to do so in a single area, charitable giving. This aims 
WRHQKDQFHWKHILUP¶VSROLWLFDOFORXWIDFLOLWDWHPDUNHWLQJDQGJHQHUDOO\HQKDQFHWKHLPDJH
of the firm in order to offset instances of adverse publicity. As noted earlier, Matten and 
Moon (2008) argue that in liberal market/shareholder dominant contexts firms are likely 
to practice explicit CSR, choosing to give in a manner that often is nonetheless at least 
partially informed by profitability concerns. This argumentation results in our second 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. Voluntary charitable giving is likely to be more pronounced in Common 
Law countries than in Civil Law ones. 
 
2.3 Corruption and Social Responsibility 
 
Whilst socialist legal origin might suggest particularly weak property owner rights, such 
countries are undergoing a protracted and complex transition process that may make such 
a categorization no longer useful.  La Porta et al. (2008) acknowledge this, by suggesting 
that such systems are drifting back to the German civil law roots.  Other accounts, such as 
Lane and Myant (2006), highlight the very protracted nature of the transition these 
economies are undergoing and the extent to which institutional coverage remains fluid 
and shifting.  Again, within much of the developing world, there is a distinction between 
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formal institutional configurations and institutional capabilities on the ground (Wood and 
Frynas, 2006).  In both instances, fluidity and uneven institutional coverage opens greater 
opportunities for corruption, allowing firms to buy their way out of regulations deemed 
burdensome, but at the same time, opening up legitimacy crises.  Hence, we explore the 
effects of corruption on CSR, as this sheds further light on the distinctions between 
societies with broadly similar legal frameworks, but with important distinctions in terms 
of how rules operate on the ground.   
A neglected dimension of institutional theory and CSR is the relationship between 
corruption control and CSR activities. Some studies have shown that good corporate 
governance is not possible in an environment of deep-seated corruption (Black & 
Tarassova, 2003; Mellahi et al., 2012).  While institutional factors help to establish the 
rules of the game through which firms gain legitimacy in the marketplace, corruption 
distorts these rules (Luo, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2006). When corruption is not controlled 
by institutional mechanisms, firms may be forced to control cost and therefore allocate 
fewer resources for social purposes. In the absence of high corruption, however, firms 
will be more lenient for social and philanthropic purposes (Baughn et al., 2007; Luo, 
2006). Therefore, it is argued that illicit acts in a corrupt environment increase transaction 
costs for firms and jeopardize their CSR activities and re-investment (Demirbag et. al. 
2015; Wood and Demirbag, 2015). Countries, on the other hand, have different norms 
and standards concerning corrupt practices. For instance, it is argued that bribery or 
kickbacks are often culturally ingrained as an acceptable practice (Luo, 2006). As Luo 
(2006) further DUJXHV ILUPV¶ SKLODQWKURSLF FRQWULEXWLRQ WR VRFLHW\ PD\ GHFUHDVH LQ
response to increased corruption perception. The logic behind this argument is based on 
Giddens` structuration theory. It is asserted that corporate philanthropic contributions 
may decrease if there are no incentives for CSR activities. Fear of governmental and 
political embezzlement may reduce philanthropic contributions and hence CSR activities 
in a highly corrupt environment (Luo, 2006). Campbell (2006) further argues that the 
pattern of interaction between firms and their stakeholders is very important for 
PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHLUEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW )LUPV¶SROLWLFDOEHKDYLRUWKHUHIRUH
is inseparable from managers¶ FRUUXSWLRQ SHUFHSWLRQ LQ D FRXQtry. Thus, our third 
hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 3. CSR activities will be more pronounced in countries where managers 
perceive higher corruption control by institutional mechanisms. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
In this paper, we use two different sources of data to examine CSR activities, both of 
which are based on surveys of executives and individuals. We would argue that CSR is a 
multifaceted concept therefore requires examination through different dimensions. Due to 
the nature of this study, our measures incorporate the first and third approach as 
summarized in the previous paragraph.  Therefore, we use two different sources of data to 
capture two different dimensions of CSR, namely socially responsible investment (SRI) 
and voluntary giving. These two indices are composite measures which aim to capture 
multifaceted nature of the concept we examine in this study. Details of these two data 
sources and created indices are explained in the following section. 
 
Data set used in this paper is compiled from three different sources. The nature of our 
research question requires a global or a dataset covers a significant proportion of 
countries around the world. There is no single database to cover voluntary CSR practices 
around the world. Secondly, we aim to H[DPLQH GLIIHUHQW OHJDO V\VWHP¶V LPSDFW RQ
voluntary CSR dimensions. World Competitiveness report is a comprehensive global 
report produced annually, and it has been used by a number of studies for different 
research questions (Fogel, 2006; Van de Vliert, 2003; Chan, Isobe and Makino, 2008; 
Demirbag and Glaister, 2010). It provides data on CSR activities in general, but 
particularly on socially responsible investment in its 2005 edition. World giving survey 
has started at a global level only after 2010, which enabled us to cover a second 
dimension of voluntary CSR. We also use world governance indicators by World Bank, 
which enables us to control for income, corruption control level in countries included in 
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this study. Similarly, this is a widely used in studies of global or comparative nature and 
considered to be a highly reliable data source (Ault and Spicer, 2014).  
 
In total, we cover 98 countries in this study. A distribution of these countries by their 
legal origin is provided in table 1. Voluntary CSR related data (SRI) was compiled from 
the Global Competitiveness Report (Porter et al., 2004; 2005). Country giving index 
(world giving index percentage score for each country) was compiled from the World 
Giving Index (2010). This is the earliest year for data collection on voluntary giving at a 
global scale; hence we could not go as far as back to 2005. Since we are using the giving 
index as a separate dependent variable to test a different dimension, having two different 
data collection dates do not affect our results as each of these indices are used in different 
regression models. We further explored the relationship between corruption control and 
propensity to engage in socially responsible behavior; greater corruption is likely to 
promote irresponsibility in other areas (Satter, 2004).  Corruption control related data 
were compiled from the :RUOG %DQN¶V :RUOGwide Governance Index, which reports 
aggregate and individual governance indicators globally over the period of 1996±2010 
(World Bank, 2010). Legal systems of countries sampled in this study were created based 
on La Porta et al. (1998) and Botero et al (2004) DQGDXWKRUV¶RZQUHVHDUFK. La Porta et 
al., (1998) and Botero et al. (2004) classify 85 countries according to their legal origin. 
We used  CIA¶V 7KH ZRUOG IDFW ERRN KWWSVZZZFLDJRYOLEUDU\SXEOLFDWLRQVWKH-
world-factbook/), and The Cornel University Legal Information Institute 
(https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/legal_systems) to identify legal origins of remaining 
13 counties included in our sample for analyses.  
 
The following section describes how variables were compiled and calculated from 
these three different sources. 
 
3.3 Variables 
 
Brammer et al. (2008) argue that genuine social responsibility is difficult to measure; it is 
hard to disentangle what is really voluntary, and the underlying motives for it (c.f. 
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Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Hopkins, 2005; Turker, 2008) )LUPV PD\ GR µJRRG
GHHGV¶ IRU WKHZURQJ UHDVRQV ,QFRQWUDVW, Singer (1995) argues that the motivations do 
not matter; what matters is the end result, and whether the overall well being of society 
(and the planet) is advanced through such actions.  In this paper, we assume the latter, as 
it is the only feasible starting point for comparing cross-national data, although we 
recognize the limitations of an inherently utilitarian starting point. Abbott and Monsen 
(1979) argue that there are three measures for social responsibility. The first is the extent 
of social reporting, the recording of activities that have some or other socially responsible 
dimension. However, the challenge here is to have an objective measure of socially 
responsible activities and attributes. The second is reputational surveys, where 
individuals are asked to rank the CSR ranking of individual corporations (ibid.: p.503).  
However, this assumes survey respondents possess good information as to the activities 
of specific firms (ibid.).  A third is content analysis of media reports, and or the attention 
and detail given to reporting CSR activities in annual reports (ibid.: p.504). The third and 
first dimension both incorporate a number of sub possible areas. These could include 
environmental issues, health and safety, equal opportunities, product safety and 
disclosure (ibid.: p. 505). Marquez and Fombrun (2005: p.306) provides a similar list, but 
also adds community relations, and international activities.  There are several ratings 
agencies who compile rankings of individual firms based on such measures; however, 
some very controversial companies do relatively well in certain rankings, and there is 
much debate surrounding the validity of metrics of responsibility compiled for 
commercial ends (c.f. Marquez and Fombrun, 2005). Moreover, such ratings often lack 
proper theoretical justification (Turker 2008: p. 414).  
 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI): The first CSR dimension this paper 
focuses on is socially responsible investing (SRI), which is rapidly growing in developed 
and developing economies and considered as a key feature of CSR activity (Hill et al, 
2007; Krumsick, 2003). SRI can be broadly conceptualized as the relative propensity of 
the firm to embed financial objectives in ethical and social commitments (Munoz-Torres 
et al, 2004). In this light, it can be argued that SRI represents a concrete diversion of 
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resources towards economic, social and ethical ends and can be therefore considered as a 
particularly good measure of genuine commitment of the firm to social and ethical values 
(Sparkes and Cowton 2004). Within the bracket of socially responsible investment is the 
environmental dimension that experienced growing interest of CSR practitioners and 
academics alike (Baughn et al, 2007; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014; Klassen and 
McLaughlin 1996).  We use the index of voluntary SRI practices of companies reported 
in the Global Competitiveness Report (Porter et al., 2005). This a composite index of 
several variables that incorporate a voluntary dimension. These variables are: µprevalence 
and HIIHFWLYHQHVVRIHQYLURQPHQWDOUHSRUWLQJ¶µprevalence of environmental marketing¶, 
µprevalence of environmental management systems¶, µprevalence of corporate 
environmental reporting¶, µimportance of environmental management for companies¶, 
µSrioritization of energy efficiency¶, µimportance of environment in business planning¶, 
and µprevalence of socially responsible investing¶. A composite index was created by a 
factor analysis of these variables (table 2 and the index was labeled as country SRI index. 
The SRI index appears to have a high reliability (&URPEDFK¶V DOSKD:0.98) and 
explanatory power (a total explained variance of 89.9%).  
 
[Insert Table 2 over here] 
 
Charitable giving: The second dependent variable used in this paper aims to capture 
another voluntary dimension. Many dimensions of CSR behavior incorporate both 
voluntary and involuntary practices, making it difficult to discern if a practice follows 
strictly the ethical ethos of improving the social and ethical life of relevant stakeholders 
and the society in general, or if it is an involuntary product of context specific rules and 
obligations (Brown and Forster, 2013).  Whilst SRI and environmental issues may often 
be the product of the latter, charitable giving represents a relatLYHO\µIUHH¶FKRLFHRIILUPV. 
In this way it can be argued that charitable giving readily deploys to suit instrumental 
concerns, and has assumed greater importance given the erosion of institutionalized 
solidarity within such contexts (see Brammer et al. 2008; 2012; Godfrey, 2005).  Hence, 
this article argues that a caveat is in order here. There is not necessarily a rigid dichotomy 
between charitable giving and other forms of corporate philanthropy. Shareholders or 
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owners may believe in the genuine worth of a particular cause, whilst other measures, for 
example, environmental ones, may make for both more effective resource utilization and 
enhance corporate reputation. At the same time, in contexts where there is a strong 
emphasis on shareholder value, it is likely that, at least in part, voluntaristic corporate 
practices are particularly likely to be prompted by concerns for the bottom line (see 
Goergen et al. 2009; La Porta et al. 1998; Roe 2003). Charitable giving (giving index 
percentage score) was compiled from World Giving Index created by Charities Aid 
Foundation (CAF, 2010). World Giving Index takes into account all three charitable 
behaviors in the survey (CAF, 2010). These are whether the respondent donated money 
to an organization, volunteered time to an organization, and helped a stranger or someone 
they did not know who needed help (CAF, 2010).  The giving index has been created by 
calculating an average of the three measures in order to come up with an overall country 
score. 
 
3.3.2 Independent variables 
 
Corruption Control (log corruption): 
Corruption control is one of six composite indices created to measure governance around 
the world by the World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators are also known as 
.DXIIPDQ¶V LQGH[ 7KH :*, GUDZ RQ GDWD IURP 31 different sources that provide 
information on various aspects of governance 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm). We used log transformed 
version of this measure in regression models. 
 
Legal Systems:  
These are dummy variables created for countries covered in this paper. Legal systems of 
countries were classified into one of the five groups used by La Porta et al. (1998) and 
Botero et al (2004). 
 
3.3.3 Control Variables 
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GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power: We use GDP per capita in purchasing 
power from the World Bank (2005 and 2010). We used the log transformed version of 
this measure in regression models.  
 
High SRI: The regression model has a dummy called ³KLJK´ZKLFKWDNHVDYDOXHRQHLI
SRI index is high (in this case positive) and a value of zero if SRI index is low (negative). 
The reason 0 is the cut off value comes from the distribution of SRI: Mean = 0, Median = 
-0.08, min = -2.31, max = 2.30. A rough Gaussian distribution of the variable centered 
around 0, and hence we use this as the threshold. 
 
Our analyses indicated that there are high level of correlations between GDP per capita, 
corruption, and many other country level variables therefore we decided to use only GDP 
per capita (purchasing power) and high SRI as control variables. High correlations 
suggest the new variables may add little explanation in regression models (Knack and 
Keefer, 1995). Studies of similar nature reported high level of correlations between 
country level variables (Lancee and Van de Werfhorst, 2012). 
 
4. Results  
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of dependent and 
independent variables in the study. The pairwise correlations do not seem to present 
serious multicollinearity problems for the multivariate analysis, as none of the variables 
have correlation that might distort estimation.  
 
[Insert Table 3 over here] 
 
In order to examine the impact of institutional level factors (corruption control and legal 
origin) on voluntary CSR dimensions, 6 regression models were estimated with the 
dependent variables being voluntary SRI index and giving index. The effects of 
independent variables on each of the dependent variables of voluntary SRI and voluntary 
giving indices are shown in tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
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[Insert Table 4 and 5 over here] 
 
The effects of independent variables on SRI index were tested in models 1,2 and 3 of 
table 4. In model 2 of table 4, we examine interaction effect between high SRI and log of 
GDP per capita which is measured by purchasing power (PPP). Similarly, the interaction 
of high SRI and corruption control (log corruption) is tested in model 3 of table 4. In both 
models 2 and 3 (in WDEOHZHXVHDGXPP\FDOOHG³KLJK´ZKLFKtakes a value of one if 
SRI index is high (in this case positive) and a value of zero if SRI index is low (negative). 
For each of the regression models, variance inflation factors (VIF) were examined to 
determine the existence of multicollinearity. None of the VIF scores were above 2.9, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem with these data (Hair et al., 2006). 
The model 1 of table 4 reveals that Scandinavian legal system has the highest 
effect on voluntary SRI index ȕ=1.447 S ZKLOH LW LV IROORZHG E\ the German 
OHJDO V\VWHP ȕ ; p<0.000) which corroborates H1. The English legal system 
appears to have the least impact on SRI LQGH[ȕ ; p<0.000). The (state) socialist 
legal origin system on the other hand, does not have any statistically significant effect on 
voluntary SRI index in this model. The corruption control index appears to have a high 
impact on voluntary SRI index of countries VDPSOHGIRUWKLVVWXG\ȕ ; p<0.000).  
In other words, in countries where corruption is more closely controlled, firms are more 
likely to be socially responsible, hence providing partial support to H3. 
In order to examine differences between the high and the low SRI index countries 
we create an artificial control group (in this case high SRI countries) to see if the main 
effects change compared to the whole sample. Therefore, we test the interaction of 
logGDP with the dummy variable created for high SRI index countries (high), but the 
dummy variable itself is not included in the regression. This interaction tests to see if the 
effect of logGDP on SRI index changes if we consider only those countries where SRI 
index (therefore the level of CSR adoption) is high. We see there is very little change in 
the way all variables affect SRI index, except that the magnitude of logGDP coefficient is 
now smaller (0.285 < 0.490). Similarly, we examine the interaction effect of high SRI 
adoption with corruption control (high*logCorr), once again, there is very little change, 
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except that the impact of logCorr is lower (0.666 < 0.89). Both sets of interactions show 
that the impact of the key variables, logGDP and logCorr have a reduced impact for high 
SRI adoption countries compared to low SRI adoption countries. This is something 
similar to a nonlinear (concave) impact.  
In models 4, 5 and 6 of table 5 however, we test independent variables impact on 
voluntary giving index. Models in table 5 display a similar pattern to models presented in 
table 4 albeit with some changes in signs of coefficients. Coefficients of 
English/Common Law legal origin and corruption control in Model 4 are both positive 
and significant (p<0.000) indicating that the English/Common Law legal origin creates 
the highest voluntary giving, hence confirming H2. The state socialist legal origin system 
however shows a negative signed coefficient which implies that it has a negative impact 
on voluntary giving index. Surprisingly, both the German and the Scandinavian legal 
system do not seem to have any statistically significant impact on voluntary giving index. 
7KHLQWHUDFWLRQHIIHFWRIORJ*13ZLWK³KLJK´ZKLFKVKRZVRQFHDJDLQWKDWWKHLPSDFWRI
logGNP is decreased for countries with higher values of SRI index (1.39 < 9.22).  We 
also examine the interaction effect of logCorr with higher values of SRI, but, in this 
instance, neither the main effect of logCorr nor the interaction are significant. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
As suggested by the first hypothesis, there is a relationship between institutional context, 
and, more explicitly, legal origin ± and implicitly shareholder vs. stakeholder rights - and 
CSR.  And, reflecting stronger shareholder rights (and, possibly, a greater restraint on the 
pursuit of esteem and prestige by managers), organizations operating in contexts with a 
Common Law legal origin give significantly less attention to CSR. Hence, Hypothesis 1 
is supported.  
 However, the direction of causality is not strictly on the lines suggested by La 
Porta and colleagues (1998; 2000). More specifically, the latter would suggest that firms 
would disburse more organizational resources in directions other than for the narrow 
pursuit of immediate shareholder value in contexts where owner rights were weakest. 
Hence, CSR should be more prominent in French Civil Law ones than German or 
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Scandinavian ones, which infuse some features of Common Law; Scandinavian law 
represents the Civil Law orientated system where shareholder rights are the strongest 
(albeit still weaker than Common Law).  Why would this be the cDVH"/D3RUWDHWDO¶V
(1998; 2000) approach, as noted earlier, is a rational hierarchical one, where owner and 
other stakeholder rights represent a zero sum game (Goergen et al., 2009).  This approach 
discounts the possibility of complementarity, of win-win situations where the sum of 
inputs is greater than a review of their component parts would suggest.   Although 
$PDEOH¶VFRXQWU\GLVWLQFWLRQVEURDGO\UHVSRQGWRWKRVHRI/D3RUWDHWDO
the former, derived from cluster analysis of a wide range of societal and economic 
metrics, sees them as discrete categories; this would suggest that, rather than being 
diluted Civil Law systems that accord relatively more rights to property owners, the 
Scandinavian countries are associated with particularly well-developed accommodations 
between shareholders and other stakeholders, that constrain their ability to act 
autonomously of each other, yet allow for synergies, whereby each side can gain benefits 
greater than if they had selfishly pursued their individual interests.  Again,  Germany - 
and the Rhineland economies more generally - are depicted by the literature on 
comparative capitalism to be associated with more deeply embedded stakeholder rights 
than in France and other countries with classic French civil law systems (Amable 2003; 
Hall and Soskice 2001).  Again, this would suggest that, contrary to La Porta et al. 
(2008), the strongest stakeholder rights (and, by implication higher levels of social 
responsibility) are not necessarily a reflection of weak owner rights or institutional 
inefficiencies; it is possible for accommodations between the two to take place, made 
possible by complementarity (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
Engaging in socially responsible activities do not necessarily mean that 
shareholders lose out, even if the reasons for their adoption are not strictly instrumental.  
For example, it is possible that some investors may assume that part of their duty is to 
promote local economic development and sustainability (e.g. some of the shareholders of 
the Volkswagen group; the Robert Bosch Foundation), whilst performing such a role may 
in turn, facilitate in building customer loyalty within the said region.  Similarly, ethical 
investors may demand high standards of health and safety as a desirable goal in its own 
right, which, in turn, may enhance employee commitment, with ultimate productivity 
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gains.  The research revealed that, in some institutional settings, such complementarities 
appear more likely (Wood and Frynas, 2006; Wood, Dibben, and Ogden, 2014).  However, 
it is also apparent that there is considerably more that defines setting than simply property 
owner rights.  This is particularly so since categories such as the µpurer¶ French Civil 
Law tradition are very diverse ones, encompassing countries at a wide range of stages of 
development, and with considerable variations in the capabilities of the state to enforce 
legislation. 
 However, the clear patterns that emerged when comparing differences between 
countries in Western Europe were less apparent in looking at post-state-socialist central-
eastern Europe.  More specifically, we found that a socialist legal origin system did not 
have impact on voluntary CSR activities. There are two possible explanations for this.  
The first is that categories such as µ(state) socialist legal origin¶ or µtransitional¶ are not 
very helpful in looking at countries within the region. Such categories assume strong path 
dependence and discount the very real changes that have taken place within different 
countries some twenty five years after the end of state socialist rule. There is a 
considerable body of literature that suggests that some countries have converged with 
more mature capitalist archetypes. For example, there is a growing body of literature that 
concludes that Estonia and other Baltic Republics are now a full-fledged LME or 
shareholder dominant model, and Slovenia a CME or stakeholder model, differences in 
legal origin notwithstanding (Alas and Tafel, 2008; Kovaliov and Streimikiene, 2008; 
Lane and Myant, 2006; Mygind et al, 2006; Übius and Alas, 2010).   
 It has been argued that during the transition CSR basically evolved as a response 
of business to globalization, moulded by specific circumstances (Mizobata, 2010; 
Polishchuk, 2009). Privatization significantly affected the form CSR assumed, but 
varying according to country. In some cases like Russia, privatization was particularly 
dramatic 6XFK ³ELJ EDQJ´ SULYDWL]DWLRQ &KHQ  greatly traumatized the Russian 
population who correctly perceived the outcomes as a deeply unfair deal. This brought 
great mistrust in government and, even more so, in big businesses with consequent 
serious legitimation crisis (Kuznetsov, et al 2008). In other countries like Slovenia, Baltic 
Republics, etc., the process was less traumatic due to their generally better economic 
situation (Mygind et al 2006). Even if the privatization process undergone varied, the 
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transition to the market economy brought a general and deep rethinking of the role of all 
stakeholders, and the state in particular. 
For reasons noted above, legitimation crises may result in some highly focused 
CSR activities. Within criminal states in the region - a category that would almost 
certainly encompass Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kosovo, and possibly Serbia ± high 
profile individuals, engaged in large-scale primitive expropriation, and then sought to 
entrench their right to ill-gotten gains through conspicuous philanthropic projects. The 
latter has ranged from the restoration or building of Orthodox churches to µgiving¶ 
financial handouts to highly peripheralized clans, urban centres or even entire regions 
(Satter, 2004). Mizobata rightly points at the dual character of philanthropy in Russia 
acting as public policy and business strategy. (Mizobata, 2010, p14).  In countries with 
weak institutional environment and low level of law observance, it seems natural that 
CSR perception would be quite different from the one adopted in Western countries, and, 
LQFDQEHDUJXHGPRUHDNLQWRµSXEOLFUHODWLRQVH[HUFLVHV¶ (Kuznetsov et al, 2009).  
 This leads us on to our second hypothesis. As suggested by legitimation 
approaches, charitable giving was most pronounced in Common Law legal systems. It is 
likely that legitimacy gaps prompting such giving were, at least in part, a lack of 
willingness to engage in responsible behavior in other areas.  In contrast, in Civil Law 
contexts, there was not a statistically significant relationship between legal family branch 
(e.g. German, Scandinavian) and proclivity towards charitable giving. This would 
probably reflect the outcome of different counter-tendencies. The first is that firms in 
such contexts are less likely to be prompted into charitable giving by legitimacy 
concerns. Closer and denser ties with a wide range of stakeholders mean that the firm is 
more likely to take account of their wishes in the first place. Second, and opposed to this, 
taking account of shareholder concerns will, of necessity, involve allocating some 
organizational resources and/or capabilities to meeting their concerns, which may or may 
not entail charitable giving. 
But, given the relationship between a Common Law legal origin and charitable 
giving, what about other settings where legitimacy crises are likely to be encountered? In 
countries with a socialist legal origin, charitable giving was the least, although this 
finding appears to mask a great deal of internal diversity. Within most national contexts 
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in the region, painful economic reforms have imposed great austerity, forcing many 
established firms into bitter battles for survival, with meager profits limiting the capacity 
to give.  But, within the criminal periphery, legitimacy-prompted charitable giving is 
likely to be more significant, but instrumentally focused, cost effective, and short-termist 
than in Common Law contexts, where a somewhat longer-term view is possible (c.f. 
Satter, 2004).  As Matten and Moon (2008) note, weak civil society and a parasitic 
relationship between firms and government may combine with a lack of a tradition of 
responsible conduct by firms to militate against social responsible behavior; indeed, in 
very corrupt contexts, there are strong disincentives to altruism in that gifts may be easily 
misappropriated (Satter, 2004).  A culture of pervasive corruption may serve to debase 
behavior in other areas. Indeed, we found that in countries where corruption is more 
closely controlled, firms are more likely to be socially responsible, broadly proving our 
third hypothesis.  At the same time, the regression coefficients on the relationship 
between corruption and voluntary giving are highly diffuse. This could reflect the extent 
to which there are counter-incentives: donations to causes favoured by corrupt elites 
could provide one channel for firms to curry favour with politicians.   
 There are certain limitations to this research, which serve to highlight possible 
future directions and priorities. Firstly, WKHXVDJHRI/D3RUWDHWDO¶V1998; 2000) measure 
of owner and stakeholder rights is not unproblematic (Armour et al., 2009a; 2009b).  In 
particular, it assumes a very strong path dependence, which discounts the possibilities for 
major institutional redesign, or for one institutional archetype to converge with another. 
Indeed, La Porta et al. (2008) suggest that state socialist legal origin countries of central 
and Eastern Europe are drifting back to their Germanic legal origin roots; in contrast, the 
literature on comparative capitalism would suggest that, some of these economies have 
moved close to the LME idea (Lane and Myant, 2006). In line with earlier work on 
comparative institutional analysis, this study focuses on the relationship between context 
and broad socio-economic level outcomes, approaching the firm as a transmission belt 
between the two (Hall and Soskice 2001; La Porta et al. 2008; Wood et al., 2014); this 
enabled the coverage of a very wide range of countries, from many of which, firm level 
data on CSR is relatively scarce. We recognize that the usage of firm level data would 
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provide a very much more nuanced and finely grained picture, and that this constitutes a 
further limitation of this research.   
It is also apparent that there is considerably more that defines setting than simply 
property owner rights. Why then did we not employ one of the alternative country 
categorizations devised within the literature on comparative capitalism?   As noted above, 
varieties of capitalism approaches have historically been dichotomous and orientated 
towards the most developed countries, with only limited attention being accorded to 
systems that strictly conform neither to the shareholder/liberal market or 
stakeholder/coordinated archetypes, nor to the great diversity within the latter category 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Dore, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Again, multi-variety 
approaches (see for example, Amable, 2003; Whitley, 1999) remain Eurocentric, limiting 
their applicability elsewherei DQG ZLWKLQ :HVWHUQ DQG 6RXWKHUQ (XURSH $PDEOH¶V
categories in any event broadly correspond with those of La Porta et al (2008), France 
excluded.  Moreover, a focus only on Europe would make it difficult to draw conclusions 
on the relationship between shareholder dominant setting and CSR, given the relatively 
few examples of such systems on the continent.. Finally, this study does not explore 
changes over time.  However, whilst more pessimistic accounts of institutional change in 
more stakeholder orientated institutional settings suggest systemic decay (Streeck 2009), 
the research found continued difference between context and practice; in general, firms in 
stakeholder orientated settings remained more responsible than those in shareholder 
dominant ones.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The research revealed a close relationship between institutional setting and corporate 
social responsibility. More specifically, within contexts where owner rights were 
stronger, firms were less likely to spend more on a range of voluntary CSR measures. 
However, the converse is not directly true.  In national contexts where the Civil Law 
ideal is most pronounced, that is those of French legal sub-family, voluntary CSR 
spending (whilst significantly more than in shareholder dominant rights settings) is less 
than in more mixed or diluted Civil Law traditions, such as Scandinavian or German law. 
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In part this could be accounted for by the sheer diversity of the former category, but it is 
also likely to reflect the possibilities of complementarity.  For example, within the 
German context, large manufacturing firms reap the benefits of high productivity that 
comes with strong employee commitment; in part, this reflects superior terms and 
conditions of service, but also safe and pleasant working environments, and close ties 
between firms and communities.   
 In short, firms operating in Common Law contexts are less likely to take CSR 
seriously. However, there is one exception to this general rule, in the area of voluntary 
charitable giving.  Countries of Common Law legal origin ± that is where owner rights 
are strongest ± are more likely to engage in the former.  Firms in such contexts are most 
likely to be closely orientated to maximizing shareholder value, with managers having 
relatively less discretion to direct organizational resources in other directions. Given this, 
it is likely that giving will be instrumentally intended to promote profitability, to facilitate 
marketing and/or resolve wider crises of legitimacy. In contrast, in contexts where owner 
rights are weaker, managers have greater autonomy to direct organizational resources in 
directions other than the maximization of shareholder value.   What this finding points to 
is confirm the tension between business-driven and multi-stakeholder forms of CSR 
(Brammer et al. 2012). An epitome of the former is charitable giving especially when 
used to promote causes that serve corporate interests and/or provide legitimacy, and of 
the latter environmental responsibility, in other words, that the firm seeks to reduce the 
externalization of the costs of its activities on the community at large.   
 Whilst we did encounter significant differences between Civil Law and Common 
Law systems, no clear pattern emerged between (state) socialist legal origin and the 
propensity of firms to engage in CSR. It is likely that this reflects the diversity of this 
category, and the extent to which countries in the region have diverged into different 
paths (Lane and Myant, 2006). In some, property owner rights have become stronger, and 
others, they have become systemically re-mediated through focused institutional 
redesign.  Still others have degenerated into criminal states (Satter 2004). What the 
region does have in common is that charitable giving is relatively low. This probably 
reflects the limited resources available to firms battling to cope with external shocks and 
ongoing crises of competitiveness. It may also, within criminal states, reflect excessive, 
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self-destructive, short-termism, in contrast to the more sophisticated approaches of 
property owners in stable Common Law systems, and the greater ability to co-opt 
powerful interests to suit corporate agendas, regardless of public pressure. It also 
highlights the limitations of models that assume strong path dependence, and the need for 
comparative analysis to incorporate an understanding of the dynamics of systemic change 
(c.f. Boyer 2006).  
The study revealed that the Civil Law stakeholder model retains distinct features, 
even if as Matten and Moon (2008) suggest, there may be a long-term tendency towards 
more explicit CSR in the most developed economies in the former category.  The same 
goes for countries that fall into the broad state socialist legal origin category. Finally, we 
found that socially responsible behavior was more likely in settings where there is a 
stronger control on corruption; high levels of corruption that go unchecked may well 
debase behavior in other areas.  In other words, if firms are accustomed to being able to 
buy their way out of problems with regulators, they may feel less need to have to placate 
the public at large.   
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Table 1 Distribution of sample by legal origin 
 
Legal Origin Countries 
English Common Law 
(30 countries) 
Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, Ghana, 
Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
German Civil Law 
(7countries) 
Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Taiwan 
Scandinavian Civil 
Law (5 countries) 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 
French Civil Law (35 
countries) 
Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chad, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
France, Gambia, Honduras, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
State socialist origin 
(19 countries) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, Vietnam 
Islamic-Civil Law (2 
countries) 
Bahrain, United Arab Emirates 
Sources: La Porta et al. 1998; Botero et al. 2004 and aXWKRU¶VRZQUHVHDUFK 
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Table 2:  Factor scores for Voluntary CSR- component matrix 
 
 Factor 
loadings 
Eigen 
value 
% of variance 
explained 
Prevalence environmental marketing 0.949 6.29 89.99 
Prevalence of environmental management 
systems 
0.935 
  
Prevalence of corporate environmental 
reporting 
0.946 
  
Importance of corporate social 
responsibility 
0.951 
  
Prioritization of energy efficiency 0.961   
Importance  of environment in business 
planning 
0.932 
  
Prevalence of socially responsible investing 0.966   
    
&URPEDK¶VDOSKD     KMO= 0.899 
%DUWOHWW¶VWHVWRIVSKHULFLW\   Significance = 0.000 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 
Variables Mean SD SRI 
index 
Corruption 
control 
Giving 
index 
Log 
GDP 
per 
capita 
English German  Scandina
vian 
French  Socialist 
SRI index 0.00 1.00 1.00         
Corruption control 57.88 27.32 0.56 1.00        
Giving index 32.11 11.52 0.45 0.21 1.00       
Log GDP per capita 4.01 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.33 1.00      
English   0.13 -0.00 0.36 -0.14 1.00     
German   0.43 0.20 0.17 0.30 -0.15 1.00    
Scandinavian   0.38 0.23 0.18 0.35 -0.13 -0.06 1.00   
French   -0.19 -0.08 -0.17 -0.12 -0.39 -0.17 -0.15 1.00  
Socialist   -0.17 -0.03 -0.47 0.09 -0.28 -0.12 -0.10 -0.31 1.00 
 
Coefficients greater than 0.25 are significant at 0.00 
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Table 4 Regression Results-Legal origin impact on socially responsible investment (SRI index) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 ȕ t ȕ t ȕ t 
Log Corruption control 0.890 3.229** 0.544 3.151**   
English legal system 0.587 3.726*** 0.280 0.111* 0.337 3.005** 
German legal system 1.404 5.036*** 0.915 4.654*** 0.926 4.641*** 
Scandinavian legal system 1.447 4.514*** 0.985 4.381*** 0.988 4.338*** 
Socialist legal system -0.139 -0.779 -0.0718 -0.587 -0.064 -0.552 
Log GDP per capita 0.490 2.948**   0.287 2.719** 
Log GDP * high   0.285 11.182***   
Log Corruption C *high     0.666 11.161*** 
Constant -3.765 -6.843*** -1.669 -6.094*** -1.926 -4.755*** 
F statistic  25.18***  70.69***  69.1*** 
R2  0.609  0.813  0.810 
Adj R2  0.584  0.802  0.798 
Durbin-Watson  1.856  1.916  2.049 
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05;  p***<0.01 
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Table 5 Regression Results-Legal origin impact on voluntary charitable giving (Giving index) 
 
 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
 ȕ t ȕ t ȕ t 
Log Corruption control -2.166 -0.583 2.428 0.685   
English legal system 8.992 4.2*** 6.681 2.91** 7.949 3.62*** 
German legal system 3.139 0.835 3.279 0.811 1.623 0.422 
Scandinavian legal system 5.369 1.242 5.202 1.126 3.577 0.815 
Socialist legal system -11.493 -4.322*** -10.610 -4.226*** -11.527 -4.824*** 
Log GDP per capita 9.228 4.071***   7.198 3.448*** 
Log GDP * high   1.392 2.629**   
Log Corruption C *high     1.605 1.360 
Constant 2.099 -0.279 24.945 4.427*** 1.505 0.188 
F statistic  13.94***  11.37***  14.42*** 
R2  0.468  0.417  0.476 
Adj R2  0.434  0.381  0.443 
Durbin-Watson  2.434  2.266  2.363 
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05;  p***<0.01 
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Endnotes 
 
 
                                                 
i However, Business systems theory does also cover the developed Far Eastern economies, and has recently 
been applied to Africa (Wood and Frynas 2006) 
